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Abstract
We study the relation between IPO investment and the rate of interest. We
model the IPO timing decision and show that the implied relation between
interest rates and investment is non-monotonic, and the data support the im-
plication. At low rates of interest ﬁrms delay their IPOs. This happens because
during the pre-IPO period the ﬁrm forgoes earnings that do not matter as much
at low interest rates. The 1950’s and early 1960’s, especially, were periods of
very low real interest rates, and IPO investment was low, with ﬁrms delay-
ing their IPOs signiﬁcantly. A qualitative diﬀerence seems to exist between
investment of IPO-ing ﬁrms and the investment of incumbent ﬁrms which is
decreasing in the interest rate, as neoclassical theory predicts.
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
A ﬁrm’s initial public oﬀe r i n go nt h es t o c km a r k e t—i t s“ I P O ”—r e p r e s e n t sat r a n s f e r
o fo w n e r s h i po ft h eﬁrm and its assets into the hands of the public, at least in part. At
t h es a m et i m ea nI P Oa l s oa u g m e n t st h ef u n d sa v a i l a b l et ot h eﬁrm, thereby enabling
it to invest more. Clementi (2003), Pastor and Veronesi (2003) and Jovanovic and
Rousseau (2001) focus on the investment motive behind IPOs. The present paper
also treats a ﬁrm’s IPO as inseparable from a simultaneous physical investment.
The paper ﬁnds that IPOs are qualitatively diﬀerent from other investments,
especially investments made by stock-market incumbents. It investigates, further,
the role that the rate of interest plays in inﬂuencing IPOs. It ﬁnds that the relation
between the two is non-monotonic. Very high rates of interest discourage investment
for the usual reason, namely that when future income is discounted more heavily, it
is not worthwhile to sacriﬁce current resources. Very low rates of interest, however,
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Figure 1: Two qualitatively different investment schedules.
also discourage investment if that investment is irreversible. This is because when
interest rates are low, it is not as costly to wait for conditions under which the
investment is more favorable. Similar results are in Chetty (2003) and Jovanovic and
Rousseau (2001) who also provide an information-theoretic rationale for the gains to
waiting, but these authors do not test for non-monotonicity. A rough summary of the
estimated contrast between the two forms of investment — IPOs vs. established ﬁrms
—i si nF i g u r e1. Aggregate investment is negatively though not strongly related to
interest rates. IPO investment, on the other hand, has a backward bending portion,
with the positively-sloped portion much more pronounced. The two curves are not
properly scaled on the horizontal axis, though, because IPO investment is a small
fraction of all investment — roughly 11 percent over the past 40 years.
The non-monotonicity of IPO-ing ﬁrms’ physical investment in the interest rate
stems, ultimately, from the fact that the ﬁrm is giving up proﬁts while it waits to
IPO. Waiting itself delivers information, i.e., human capital, hence what really goes
on is a substitution of one form of capital for another. An IPO-ing ﬁrm faces more
uncertainty than incumbent ﬁrms, and it has a greater incentive to wait and gather
information before it invests. We comment on this again in the conclusion, and on
the implications that it may have for countries like Japan that are experiencing low
investment in spite of enjoying very low interest rates.
The plan of the paper is as follows: Section 2 explains the model, and Section
3 describes its main implications for the data that we have. Section 4 tests those
implications, and Section 5 discusses some related literature. Section 6 concludes.
2 
t = age 
y =  output 
f(t)  
Figure 2: Post-IPO output of the firm as a function of its age at IPO.
2T h e m o d e l : I P O a s a n i n v e s t m e n t
The following model is a simpliﬁe dv e r s i o no fJ o v a n o v i ca n dR o u s s e a u( 2 0 0 1). Sup-
pose the ﬁrm lives forever, and has the property rights to a project. It produces
output using knowledge, h, and physical capital k.T h e ﬁrm starts to receive net
revenue cash only after its IPO. Let T denote the waiting time until IPO. Suppose
that while it waits, the ﬁrm’s potential output is
y = f (T).
We assume that f increases with T but at a diminishing rate, as drawn in Figure
2. In this formulation the ﬁrm starts receiving y only after implementing the project
(which is often untrue — e.g., Goldman Sachs, McDonalds, etc.). At that point the
project stops improving (i.e., there is no learning by doing. This is a learning or
doing model). Moreover there are no direct costs. It makes sense if
1. funds are a constraint for private companies,
2. IPOs can deliver the funds for a signiﬁcant expansion, and
3. upon the initial expansion, the ﬁrm is irrevocably deﬁned and “fossilized” as in
the “putty clay” vision of investment.
In that case the IPO decision is much like the decision of how long to remain in
school. This is like perfecting an idea before taking out a patent on it.
32.1 Choosing the IPO date when there is no physical capital
If the ﬁrm lives forever and has the property rights to its project, it must just decide
when to implement it. There are no direct costs. Only implicit “foregone-earnings”
costs. Therefore its problem is like that of optimally cutting down a tree; the ﬁrm













Second-order conditions hold if f is concave. The LHS of (1) is the foregone-earnings
costs of waiting another period. In the problem as stated, this is the only cost.
The RHS is the gain from waiting. Since this gain is received in every subsequent
(production) period, it is capitalized, and hence the r in the denominator. It is more
revealing to write the condition as





is the rate of growth of potential output. Thus the IPO occurs when g equals the
rate of interest.
Example.–As an example, consider f (t)=Atα where α<1. Here the condition
reads α





In this simple version of the model, then, a rise in the rate of interest hastens the
IPO because it makes the foregone earning cost of waiting more important relative
to the future gains from waiting. Interestingly, the productivity of the ﬁrm, A,d o e s
not aﬀect the ﬁrm’s IPO date because it simply scales both costs and revenues in the
same proportion.
The parameter α will be important in what follows. It measures the gain in
productivity that the ﬁrm gets by delaying its IPO. Delay lets the ﬁrm resolve tech-
nological uncertainties, perfect its ideas, and choose the right inputs for its production
process. As Chetty (2003) emphasizes, such a delay makes sense if the investment
is to some extent irreversible, and this is probably true for most IPOs — at the IPO
stage a prospectus is drafted and the funds raised at IPO are used to implement the
ideas that the prospectus contains. These are some reasons why α is positive. The
more relevant these considerations are to a sector or to an epoch in history, the larger
should α be for that sector or that epoch.
42.2 Adding physical capital
To the extent that IPOs entail spending on capital goods (as suggested by the evidence
in Jain and Kini (1994) that we cited above), this implies that the eﬀect of the real
rate of interest on investment is unambiguously positive! Lower rates discourage
IPO investments by inducing ﬁr m st ow a i tl o n g e rs oa st op e r f e c tt h e i ri n v e s t m e n t s .
Information-theoretic bases for this conclusion are in Chetty (2003) and Jovanovic and
Rousseau (2001). But they allow for capital spending at T, so let us now introduce













Now the ﬁrst-order conditions read




0 (T)=0 , (4)
so that instead of (2), the condition of optimality reads







Now g is essentially a quadratic in r. When r is small, the eﬀect of r on g is positive
as before, but when r gets large, the opposite it true, and the eﬀect of r on g is
non-monotonic. Note, too, that the coeﬃcient on r2 is the capital-output ratio. As a
result, the eﬀect on T is non-monotonic too, and with it the eﬀect on IPO investment.
The example again.–To illustrate this, let us return to, and augment the example
f (t)=Atα that we studied above. The ﬁrst-order condition now reads
−At




α−1 =0 . (6)
The value of T that satisﬁes this equation is the ﬁrm’s IPO date. Equation (6)
implicitly deﬁnes T as a function of the various parameters and, in particular, as a
function of r. Sometimes it admits an explicit solution. Let us take α =1 /2,f o r




























1Some of the costs incurred at IPO are transactions costs — see Lee et al. (1996). We shall lump
all costs into I and treat them as “investment.”

























Figure 3: Plot of T on r in (7) when α =1 /2.
Note that when I =0 , this collapses to the expression in (3) evaluated at α =1 /2.
From (7) we see that for small r,t h et e r m2/r dominates, driving T to inﬁnity.
For large r,t h et e r mrI/A dominates, again driving T to inﬁnity. We therefore have
a U-shaped relation between r on the horizontal axis and T on the vertical. We
illustrate this in Figure 3 for the case where I =3 0 A. We also plot T for the case
where I =4 5 A,a n dI =6 0 A. We note that (i) the curves bottom out at levels of r
ranging between 5 and 10 percent, and (ii) higher investment outlays imply longer
waiting at all levels of interest. For practical purposes, however, the size of the outlay,
I, starts to matter only when the interest rate is relatively high, say above 4 percent.
3 Implications of the model
The model has time-series and cross-section implications. The time-series implica-
tions concern low-frequency movements in T and the market value of the ﬁrm at IPO,
which we denote as v. We are especially interested in the relation between interest
rates and IPO investment. The model assumes that r is ﬁxed, and therefore we may,
at best, take Figure 3 to predict the eﬀects on T of low-frequency movements in r.
These movements will induce changes in spending I that we shall associate with IPO
investment.
1. T vs. r.–At low frequencies, the relation between T and r is U-shaped, as
Figure 3 shows. This means that the investment schedule is backward bending.

















Figure 4: Backward bending investment schedules in (7) when α =1 /2.
2. IPO Investment vs. r.–A rise in T means that investment I is postponed.
Interest-rate variation at low frequencies will produce changes in investment
that change in the direction opposite to the change in T. Therefore the relation
between IPO investment on the vertical axis and the rate of interest on the
horizontal should have an inverted-U shape. We illustrate this in Figure 4. The
reason why the curves cross is that the investment associated with a particular
I is weighted by 1/T and yet T is increasing in I, and the ratios are not ordered
the same way at diﬀerent levels of r. But what is important here is the inverted-
U shape in the graph and this is what we shall look for in the data.















This means that when the capital-output ratio is higher for reasons other than
variation in r or α, we should expect that T also be higher. On the other hand,
if the overriding source of variation is changes in α,w em a ys e en or e l a t i o n s h i p
between T and the capital-output ratio. To see why this is so, let us use (3) as
an approximation, which tells us that as α varies, T will be roughly proportional
to α. Then in (8) variation in T will be oﬀset by equi-proportional changes in
α that will fully oﬀset any direct eﬀect that T would have on v.
4. T vs. IPO size.–The nature of this relation depends on whether ﬁrms diﬀer
mainly with respect to their capital requirements, I, or mainly with respect to








Variation in α produces a positive relation between the two: Once again, using
(3) as an approximation, we expect that T will be roughly proportional to α.






Thus, when the overriding source of variation in the data is changes in pre-IPO
growth opportunities, we should expect an iso-elastic, positive relation between
IPO size, v,a n dI P O - i n gﬁrm age, T. On the other hand, variation in I produces






Therefore changes in v that do not originate in either r or in α should cause T
to fall.




f (T) − I (11)
denote the market value of the ﬁrm at its IPO. When interest rates are moderate
or low, say below 4 or 5 percent, a rise in interest rates unambiguously lowers v,
both directly, and also by reducing T. At higher levels of r the relationship is
ambiguous. In spite of this ambiguity, we shall document the relation between
r and IPO size in the next section.
4 Tests of the implications
Having listed the main implications of the model, we report on how they fare with
the data, taking them up in the order in which they are listed above.
4.1 Testing T vs. r
The ﬁrst implication says that the relation between T and r should be U-shaped. To
measure T, we construct average waiting times from founding and incorporation to
listing for exchange-listed ﬁrms since 1886 based on individual company histories and
our extension of the stock ﬁles made available by the University of Chicago’s Center
for Research in Securities Prices (CRSP) database from its 19 2 5s t a r t i n gd a t eb a c k
8Year of Listing











Figure 5: Waiting times to exchange listing, 1886-2002.
Table 1—Number of Firms in the Waiting-Time Sample
All New Included Included
Decade CRSP Listings Incorporations Foundings
1890’s 1125 2 4 1
1900’s 1127 8 4 4
1910’s 214 190 97
1920’s 545 492 273
1930’s 2311 97 78
1940’s 271 246 97
1950’s 254 241 78
1960’s 2,008 964 198
1970’s 4,517 1,405 262
1980’s 6,322 904 790
1990’s 7,850 1,539 1,939
2000’s 1,311 324 324
Totals 23,747 6,632 4,221







  ex-post real cp rate 
H-P filtered
Figure 6: The ex-post real interest rate on commercial paper, 1885-
2002.
through 1885 using newspaper sources.3 Figure 5 shows these series after smoothing
with the Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter. Table 1 shows the coverage of our collection of IPO
waiting times by decade. Waiting times by either measure were longest in the 1950’s
and 1960’s, and shortest at both ends of the 20th century.
Figure 6 shows the real interest rate on commercial paper with 30-90 days until
maturity over the same time period, along with an HP-ﬁltered trend.4 Real rates
were lowest in the middle of the century, and the series is roughly U-shaped. The
3Listing years after 1925 are those for which ﬁrms enter CRSP. For 1885-1924, they are years
in which prices ﬁrst appear in the NYSE listings of The Annalist, Bradstreet’s, The Commercial
and Financial Chronicle,o rThe New York Times. The 6,632 incorporation dates used to construct
Figure 5 are from Moody’s Industrial Manual (1920, 1928, 1955, 1980), Standard and Poor’s Stock
Market Encyclopedia (1981, 1988, 2000), various editions of Standard and Poor’s Stock Reports,
and Mergent Online. The 4,221 foundings are from Dun and Bradstreet’s Million Dollar Directory
(2000), Moody’s, Kelley (1954), and individual company websites. We linearly interpolate the series
between missing points before applying the HP-ﬁlter to create the time series in the ﬁgure.
4Commercial paper rates are annual averages of 30-day terms from the FRED database (Federal
Reserve Bank of St. Louis, 2003) for 1934-2002 and 60-90 day terms from Homer and Sylla (1991)
for earlier years. We compute the ex-post return by subtracting inﬂation as computed by the growth
of the implicit price deﬂator for GDP from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (2003) for 1929-2002
and Berry (1988) for earlier years.
10Real CP Rate (%)




















Y = 39.46 - 5.58 r + 0.63 r
2
        (7.7)  (-2.5)      (1.3)
Figure 7: Scatterplot of T (from founding) on r.
long wait times in the 1950’s and the corresponding negative real interest rates appear
to be roughly consistent with our model. To examine the low-frequency relationship
between T and r more precisely, however, we average both across ten year periods
and test for non-monotonicity in (7) with a quadratic regression
Figure 7 shows a scatterplot of decadal averages of T on r,w i t hT measured as
the number of years from founding to exchange listing. Figure 8 instead uses years
from incorporation as the measure of T. In either case, a U-shaped pattern appears
in the data. The regressions in Table 1 conﬁrm this, with the coeﬃcient on the real
interest rate negative and signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level for the linear term and
positive for the quadratic term. We interpret this as supporting evidence for the ﬁrst
implication of our model. We note, however, that negative real interest rates are
inconsistent with the model and that instead of varying between zero and ten percent
(as it does in the theoretical plots of Figures 1-3), the decadal averages vary from
about negative three percent to seven percent.
4.2 Testing IPO and incumbents’ investment vs. r
The second implication deals with the relation between IPO investment and the real
rate of interest. In testing for this, we oﬀer a parallel analysis of the relation between
aggregate investment (which is dominated by investment of stock-market incumbents)
and interest rates. We do this because we wish to contrast the two relations.
11Real CP Rate (%)





















Y = 19.81 - 2.96r + 0.37r
2
            (6.1)   (-2.1)    (1.2)
Figure 8: Scatterplot of T (from incorporation) on r.
Table 1. Regressions of waiting times (T)o nt h er e a l
commercial paper rate (r)b yd e c a d e ,1886-2002.
Dependent variable
T from founding T from incorporation
rt -3.47 -5.58 -1.71 -2.96




constant 41.68 39.46 21.11 19.81
(8.37) (7.65) (6.80) (6.10)
R2 .33 .43 .24 .34
N 12 12 12 12
Note: t-statistics are in parentheses.
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Figure 9: Annual IPOs as a percent of stock market value, and private
investment as a percent of the capital stock, 1886-2002.
IPO-ing ﬁrms probably face much greater uncertainty than do incumbent ﬁrms.
IPO-ing ﬁrms are in the process of deﬁning themselves, their products and their
technologies, and once they have chosen these directions, there is no going back
for most of them. Choosing the wrong standard, for example, can condemn a new
business to an early demise. There is a real sense, then, in which their investments
are irreversible.
Incumbent ﬁrms, on the other hand, ﬁrms that have chosen their domains of
operation, face uncertainty more in the scale of demand, input prices, and so on, and
therefore the risks that they face are of a diﬀerent nature. There is less to be gained by
waiting, less uncertainty to be resolved by delaying investment. Therefore we would
expect incumbents to have investment related negatively to the rate of interest. So,
while we shall not oﬀer a model of incumbent investment, we note that the standard
Q-theory model of investment — e.g., Hayashi (1982) — with convex adjustment costs
and no irreversibilities, predicts that a rise in the interest rate reduces investment.
Our model implies that, unlike incumbent investment, the relation between IPO
investment and the rate of interest should be an inverted-U. Figure 9 shows the two
investment series that we consider. The solid line is private domestic investment as
a percentage of the aggregate capital stock.5 The dashed line is the value of IPO-ing
5T ob u i l dt h ei n v e s t m e n tr a t es e r i e s ,w es t a r tw i t hg r o s sp r i v a t ed o m e s t i ci n v e s t m e n ti nc u r r e n t
13Real CP Rate (%)






















Ipo/Mcap = 3.51 + 0.56 r - 0.11 r
2
                    (4.7)   (1.7)    (-1.5)
Figure 10: S c a t t e r p l o to fI P O sa sas h a r eo fs t o c km a r k e tc a p i t a l i z a -
tion on r.
ﬁrms at the end of each year as a percentage of total stock market capitalization.6
While investment rates tended to rise until the Great Depression and then stabilized
after the Second World War, IPOs followed a more erratic pattern, with the value
of new equity largest around the turn of the 20th century, around 1915, in the late
1920’s, at the end of the Second World War, in the late 1960s, the mid-1980s, and
the 1990s.
dollars from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (2003, Table 1, pp. 123-4) for 1929-2002 and join
the gross capital formation series in current dollars, excluding military expenditures, from Kuznets
(1961b, Tables T-8 and T-8a) for 1870-1929. We construct the net capital stock using the private
ﬁxed assets tables of the Bureau of Economic Analysis (2003) for 1925-2002. Then, using the
estimates of the net stock of non-military capital from Kuznets (1961a, Table 3, pp. 64-5) in 1869,
1879, 1889, 1909, 1919, and 1929 as benchmarks, we use the percent changes in a synthetic series
for the capital stock formed by starting with the 1869 Kuznets (1961a) estimate of $27 billion and
adding net capital formation in each year through 1929 from Kuznets (1961b) to create an annual
series that runs through the benchmark points. Finally, we join the resulting series for 1870-1925
to the later BEA series. The investment rate that appears in Figure 9 is the ratio of our ﬁnal
investment series to the capital stock series, expressed as a percentage.
6T h es t o c km a r k e td a t aa r ef r o mt h eC R S Pﬁles for 1925-2002. NYSE ﬁrms are available in
CRSP continuously, AMEX ﬁrms after 1961, and NASDAQ ﬁrms after 1971. We extended the
CRSP stock ﬁles backward from their 1925 starting year by collecting year-end observations from
1885 to 1925 for all common stocks traded on the NYSE. New listings are given by the total year-
end market value of ﬁrms that entered our database in each year, excluding American Depository
Receipts (ADR’s).
14Real CP Rate (%)





















I/K = 6.37 - 0.16 r  
         (8.1)  (-0.7) 
Figure 11: Scatterplot of the investment rate on r.
Table 2. Regressions of IPO’s and the investment rate on
the commercial paper rate (r) by decade, 1886-2002.
Dependent variable
IPOs / Stock Market I/K
rt 0.20 0.56 -0.160 . 2 1




constant 3.133 . 5 1 6.37 6.76
(4.23) (4.71) (8.08) (8.49)
R2 .07 .25 .04 .22
N 12 12 12 12
Note: t-statistics are in parentheses.
15To examine the low-frequency relationship between these measures of investment
and r more precisely, we again average across ten year periods.
Figure 10 shows a scatterplot of decadal averages of r on IPO value, along with
the ﬁtted values from a quadratic regression. Figure 11 shows the scatterplot and lin-
ear regression line for incumbent investments. We report the details of the quadratic
regressions and their linear counterparts in Table 2. For IPO investment, the linear
term is positive and statistically signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level, while the coeﬃ-
cient on the quadratic term is negative and approaching statistical signiﬁcance. We
interpret this as evidence for the inverted U-shape that the model predicts. With
incumbent investment, we also ﬁnd an inverted U-shape, but the coeﬃcient on the
linear term is much smaller and not statistically signiﬁcant. A linear ﬁtt h u ss e e m s
more appropriate, and this is what we show in Figure 11.
4.3 Testing T vs. the capital-output ratio
The model’s third implication is that ﬁrms with capital-intensive projects will wait
longer to have an IPO than ﬁrms with projects that are less capital intensive. We
test this at the sectoral level using the 1987 Standard Industry Classiﬁcations to
construct the ratio of ﬁxed assets to GDP for 49 sectors from the detailed tables
made available by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (2003). To ensure an adequate
number of observations to estimate mean waiting times by sector, we pool our IPO
data over the period from 1987-2002. To match this timing with that chosen for the
capital-output ratio, we average it over the same period.
Table 3. Regressions of waiting times to IPO on the
capital-output ratio (K/Y)b ys e c t o r ,1987-2002.
Dependent variable







Note: t-statistics are in parentheses.
The results, reported in Table 3, indicate that there is no statistically signiﬁcant
relationship between sectoral capital-output ratios and mean waiting times, whether
measured by years from founding or years from incorporation. According to our model
16this can happen only if the main diﬀerence is variation in learning opportunities as
expressed by α.
4.4 Testing T vs. IPO Size
The model’s fourth implication deals with the relation between the size of an IPO and
the delay in having it. If the overriding source of variation in the data is changes in
pre-IPO growth opportunities, we should ﬁnd a positive relation between IPO size, v,
and IPO-ing ﬁrm age, T. On the other hand, variation in I would produce a negative
relation. We examine this using ﬁrm-level data on IPO size and our database of
waiting times, measuring IPO size as the market value of a ﬁrm at the end of the
year in which it enters CRSP after converting to millions of 2002 dollars using the
implicit price deﬂator for GDP.
Table 4. Firm-level regressions of waiting times (T)o n
real IPO size (v) by decade, 1886-2002.
Dependent variable





R2 .52 .53 .47 .48
N 4206 4206 6264 6264
Note: t-statistics are in parentheses.
Pooling our IPO data from 1886 to 2002 and including yearly dummies in re-
gressions of T on v and T on log(v), we ﬁnd the relationship to be positive and
statistically signiﬁcant in all cases. Table 4 shows these results, which support the
view that variations in α dominate the relation. Therefore this test, as did the previ-
ous one, suggests that the main reason why T varies over time is changes in learning
opportunities as expressed by α.
4.5 Testing IPO Size vs. r
The model’s ﬁfth main implication is that the relation between the real rate of interest
and IPO size should be negative at low rates of interest, and ambiguous at higher
rates. As in our tests of investment and r, we pool across decades using the average
real rate on short-term commercial paper. We then compute the average size of
ﬁrms entering CRSP in each year and average them across decades to construct the
dependent variable. Our regression of IPO size on r yielded
17IPOsize =3 18.69 + 2.862 r R2= .002, N=12.
(4.93) (0.14)
No discernible relation exists between IPOsize and r. This is what one would expect
at higher interest rates, but the model does predict that at lower levels of r the relation
should be negative. The likely explanation for why we do not ﬁnd this is the volatility
o fs t o c kp r i c e s .I P Os i z ei sm e a s u r e da st h eﬁrm’s stock market value right after its
IPO. This measure ﬂuctuates with the stock market and introduces noise into the
variable IPOsize that is not present in our measures of a ﬁrm’s age.
4.6 Summary of the empirical results
The implications of the model are on the whole conﬁrmed. This is especially true
of those regarding the backward-bending IPO-investment schedule. The evidence
is easier to reconcile with the model if one assumes that learning opportunities, as
summarized by the parameter α, have varied over time and over sectors.
5 Other theories and evidence
Our focus has been on the individual ﬁrm’s decision, and not the aggregate equi-
librium aspects surrounding IPOs. Had we analyzed these, we would have needed
to mention economies of scale in IPO activity and start-up activity (due, e.g., to
concentration of focus by venture capitalists), and to discuss the models of Diamond
(1982) and Veldcamp (2003) that could perhaps explain some IPO waves.
We have assumed that, at IPO, the public pays for the ﬁrm exactly what it is
worth. In a more expansive paper one could entertain hypotheses involving waves
of irrational exuberance. Along the lines of Shleifer and Vishny’s (2003) paper on
mergers, one could argue that perhaps IPO-ing ﬁrms wait in the wings in order to take
advantage of such exuberance. If so, the beneﬁciaries are neither the IPO-ing ﬁrms
nor the participating venture capitalists themselves: Data from Ritter (2002, 2003)
show that (while being times of high IPO volume) high-Q periods are, in fact, times
of more severe underpricing of ﬁrms going public. In other words, models in which
a naive shareholder buys overpriced ﬁrms will not explain the time-series correlation
between the volume of IPOs and Tobin’s Q. Perhaps it is only investment bankers
that beneﬁt from such exuberance.
Other evidence shows that increasing funds for investment is indeed one of the
motives behinds an IPO. Jain and Kini (1994, Table 2), for example, ﬁnd that by the
fourth year after its IPO, the ﬁrm will experience a rise in sales of 80% compared to
its industry counterparts, and 143% compared to its own sales in the year just before
the IPO (see also Choe, Masulis and Nanda 1993, Lowry 2002, and Moskowitz and
Vissing-Jorgensen 2002). We ﬁnd that the 1955-2002 correlation between funds that
ﬁrms take in at IPO and their real investment is 0.33 and highly signiﬁcant.
18Aside from taking more capital in, an additional gain from an IPO may be a rise
in the ﬁrm’s eﬃciency. This motive is implicit in Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990).
Jain and Kini’s evidence that sales surge may be in part because of a rise in eﬃciency.
It has been said that being public imposes greater transparency and more regulation
on the ﬁrm, but it also delivers a lot more analyst coverage and greater discipline
because of takeover pressure. This, presumably, is largely what we mean by there
being advantages to ﬁnancial development and to the existence of well-functioning
stock markets. Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) focus on the information-generating
role of ﬁnancial markets, and their story ﬁts the fact that a private company gets no
analyst coverage until it is about to have its IPO.
Our assumption that the ﬁrm’s investment occurs at the time of IPO brings us
closer to the literature on liquidity constraints. When an entrepreneur has a high
return activity than he cannot fund in the capital market, he has a greater incentive
to save because those savings can fund an investment that is more proﬁtable than
the average market investment. Buera (2003) analyzes optimal saving behavior by
liquidity-constrained entrepreneurs.
6C o n c l u s i o n
We have presented and tested a neoclassical model with liquidity constraints. In this
model delay to IPO occurs because the ﬁrm is trying to improve its idea to the point
where it becomes optimal to incur the ﬁx e dc o s to fa nI P O .F r o md i ﬀerent premises
we have derived a result that is also in Chetty (2003) and Jovanovic and Rousseau
(2001), who show that when waiting leads to better information, the incentive to
delay can imply a backward-bending investment schedule as a function of the rate of
interest.
The investment schedule bends back because an irreversible investment is needed
for production, and because waiting makes that investment more productive. As
Chetty (2003) makes clear, the tension between these two forces can arise generally,
and not just in the context of IPOs.
At the same time, the result that IPO investment is rising in the real interest rate
(when that rate is low) is really a result about the composition of capital. Total in-
vestment (including information investment) may still be monotone-decreasing in the
interest rate. Firms postpone physical investment, but they gather information, and
this is human capital. Before its IPO, the value of the ﬁrm is monotone-decreasing
in the interest rate, and that value — i.e., the value of the physical and human capital
combined — is being maximized by the ﬁrm’s policy. Thus when physical investment
rises with the interest rate, this simply means that the ﬁrm’s human capital invest-
ment is falling, and perhaps so does total capital properly measured. Therefore Japan
may be in better shape than it seems today because those very individuals that are
not investing may be accumulating a diﬀerent kind of capital that is not measured as
19such. On the other hand, the model does not explain why established corporations
do not respond more elastically to reductions in interest rates.
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